Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus continues to circulate worldwide without evidence of significant antigenic drift between 2009 and 2016. By using escape mutants, we previously identified six haemagglutinin (HA) changes (T80R, G143E, G158E, N159D, K166E and A198E) that were located within antigenic sites. Combinations of these mutations were introduced into the A (H1N1)pdm09 HA plasmid by mutagenesis. Reassortant 6 : 2 viruses containing both the HA and NA genes of the A(H1N1) pdm09 and the six internal gene segments of A/PR/8/34 were rescued by reverse genetics. In vitro, HA inhibition and microneutralization assays showed that the HA hexa-mutant reassortant virus (RG1) escaped A(H1N1)pdm09 hyper-immune ferret antiserum recognition. C57Black/6 mice that received the vaccine formulated with A/California/07/09 were challenged with 2Â10 4 p.f.u. of either the 6 : 2 wild-type (WT) or RG1 viruses. Reductions in body weight loss, mortality rate and lung viral titre were observed in immunized animals challenged with the 6 : 2 WT virus compared to non-immunized mice. However, immunization did not protect mice challenged with RG1 virus. To further characterize the mutations causing this antigenic change, 11 additional RG viruses whose HA gene contained single or combinations of mutations were evaluated in vitro. Although the RG1 virus was still the least reactive against hyper-immune serum by HAI testing, mutations G158E and N159D within the Sa antigenic site appeared to play the major role in the altered antigenicity of the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. These results show that the Sa antigenic site contains the most prominent epitopes susceptible to cause an antigenic drift, escaping actual vaccine protection.
INTRODUCTION
Between March and early April 2009, a novel swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus emerged in Mexico and the United States, which then spread within weeks across the world until it was recognized on 11 June of the same year as a global pandemic virus (A(H1N1)pdm09) [1, 2] . Based on genetic sequence analysis, this pandemic virus was found to originate from multiple reassortments of avian, swine and human viruses that probably circulated in the North American swine population for over a decade [3, 4] . As for previous influenza pandemic viruses, A(H1N1)pdm09 has become established in the human population as a seasonal virus, representing the major circulating subtype during the 2013-14 and 2015-16 influenza seasons in Europe and in North America [5, 6] .
Influenza vaccines play a major role in the control of influenza epidemics by inducing the production of antibodies that are effective in preventing infections. Such antibodies are mainly directed against the viral haemagglutinin (HA), which is the key antigenic determinant. The viral evolution process allows the accumulation of mutations within the antibody binding sites of the HA that could result in altered viral antigenicity and lead to an epidemic drift. Such an event has not yet been reported for A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses despite 7 years of continual evolution, and the WHO has not updated the vaccine A(H1N1) component between 2009 and 2016 [7] . Indeed, comparison of A(H1N1)pdm09 HA genes from isolates collected in 2009 (such as A/New York/04/09, accession # ACR08541) with more recent strains (such as A/ New York/61/15, accession # ALH26545) demonstrated up to 13 amino acid (aa) differences, with no significant changes in the HA inhibition (HAI) titres. Moreover, the current trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine is still effective to prevent infections with A(H1N1)pdm09 circulating strains, as reported by Canadian investigators who estimated the mid-season 2015-16 vaccine efficacy to be about 64 % against this virus [8] . In addition, the ECDC agency concluded that the 2015-16 vaccine should still be effective according to their characterization of currently circulating A(H1N1) strains [7] . In a previous study, recombinant A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza virus mutants were generated in order to foresee the emergence of drift mutations [9] . However, no studies have reported the impact of potential drift mutations in challenged animal models immunized with the current 2015-2016 trivalent influenza vaccine.
In order to explore the antigenic drift potential of escape mutations obtained during our previous epitope mapping of the A(H1N1)pdm09 HA protein [10] , we rescued single and combined HA mutants as 6 : 2 reassortant viruses in the A/ PR/8/34 (H1N1) viral backbone [11, 12] . Of interest, six of the 11 aa substitutions found in our escape mutants were located in the predicted antigenic sites Cb (T80R; H3-numbering is used throughout the paper), Ca2 (G143E), Sa (G158E, N159D and K166E) and Sb (A198E). On the other hand, the remaining five mutations (F118L, K242E, R255K, N296T and G463E) were located outside the reported antigenic sites. The two sets of mutations were respectively introduced into viruses RG1 and RG2 for serological studies with the A/California/07/ 09 ferret antiserum. The most antigenically altered virus (RG1) was then tested for its ability to overcome the protection conferred by the current vaccine in experimentally infected mice. Finally, reassortant viruses containing single and combined mutations were further tested in vitro. Our results highlight the potential occurrence of A(H1N1)pdm09 drift variants, caused by G158E and N159D substitutions within the Sa antigenic region of the HA1 subunit.
RESULTS
Rescue of reassortant viruses obtained through reverse genetics A total of 14 6 : 2 reassortant viruses containing the six internal gene segments from A/PR/8/34 as well as the NA and HA (with appropriate mutations) genes from A/Quebec/144147/09 were rescued by reverse genetics. These included a 6 : 2 wild-type (WT) reassortant virus, the RG1 virus containing the T80R, G143E, G158E, N159D, K166E and A198E HA escape mutations located in the antigenic sites, the RG2 virus containing the F118L, K242E, R255K, N296T and G463E HA escape mutations located outside the antigenic sites, as well as various single and combined HA mutants ( Table 1 ).
The 6 : 2 reassortant virus containing the six antigenic HA mutations (RG1) is not recognized by the A/California/07/09 antiserum in vitro Characterization of reassortant WT, RG1 and RG2 viruses using HAI assays showed different profiles of reactivity against the A/California/07/09 ferret antiserum. As shown in Table 1 , serum raised against A/California/07/09 demonstrated efficient inhibition of haemagglutination of turkey red blood cells by WT and RG2 reassortant viruses The six antigenic HA mutations of the the 6 : 2 reassortant (RG1) increased affinity towards both a2,3 and a2,6 receptors and resulted in increased replication in vitro In haemagglutination elution experiments using red blood cells with different receptor types, RG1 demonstrated high titres using guinea pig red blood cells (gbRBC, known to contain a high proportion of a2,6 Gal receptors) or chicken RBC (cRBC, a2,3 Gal receptors). No elution from gbRBC could be observed after 4 h of incubation at 37 C, whereas 4 h were required for complete elution from cRBC. In the same experimental conditions, the 6 : 2 reassortant WT virus completely eluted from both RBC species after 1 h of incubation at 37 C (Table S1 , available in the online Supplementary Material). RG2 had the lowest HA titres against all tested red blood cells.
In viral yield experiments using ST6GalI-MDCK cells, the RG1 6 : 2 reassortant virus grew at higher titres compared to the WT reassortant at 24 h post-inoculation (p.i.) ( (Fig. 1 ). There were no significant differences between RG2 and WT viral titres at all tested time points.
A/California/07/09 vaccine is not protective against lethal RG1 infection in mice Prior to viral challenge, all groups of mice (the naive group, two mock-immunized groups and two immunized groups that received two doses of 2015-16 trivalent influenza vaccine) were sampled and their sera tested by ELISA. As expected, only the immunized groups had a significant serological response (data not shown).
All challenged groups of mice started to lose weight on day 2 (Fig. 2a) . Immunized WT-infected mice had a marked weight loss (À12.9±4.0 %) by day 4 post-challenge (p.c.), with a return to the baseline (À1.3±1.8 %) by day 14 p.c., although one mouse did not survive. On the other hand, the mock-immunized WT-infected group of mice maintained their weight loss from day 4 (À13.3±3.8 %) until the end of the experiment (À11.0±3.0 % on day 14 p.c.). The mean body weight losses for these two groups were significantly different (P<0.01). The mean body weight loss for the mock-immunized/RG1-infected group was significantly (P<0.05) higher than that of the mock-immunized/WTinfected group. The mean total body weight losses for mock-immunized and immunized groups infected with RG1 virus were comparable (À21.9±1.5 % and À25.7±0.2 %, respectively) at the end of their respective survival curves. On day 14 p.c., the immunized and mock-immunized WT challenged groups had survival rates of 86 and 50 %, respectively (P=0.164) (Fig. 2b) . However, the immunized and mock-immunized RG1-challenged groups had survival rates of 0 and 12.5 %, respectively (P=0.1202). Thus, no survival advantage was conferred by the influenza Lung viral titres on day 4 post-challenge (n=4), except for the mock-immunized WT group (n=3: one animal was removed due to influenza-unrelated morbidity). Each symbol represents the lung viral titre of an individual mouse and the horizontal bar depicts the mean titre in p.f.u. ml À1 for a group of mice ± the standard error of the mean (SEM). *P<0.05 and **P<0.01 for indicated comparisons on all graphs.
vaccine when mice were infected with the RG1 virus. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that for the same infectious doses in mock-immunized mice, the RG1 challenge was associated with a decreased survival rate compared to the WT virus (P=0.1202).
The mock-immunized/WT-infected animals showed mean lung viral titres (LVTs) of 1.2±0.2Â10 6 p.f.u. ml
À1
, whereas immunized/WT-infected ones had significantly lower mean LVTs of 2.8±1.4Â10 5 p.f.u. ml À1 (P<0.05) (Fig. 2c) . Conversely, mock-immunized and immunized mice infected with the RG1 virus showed similar higher LVTs of 3.4±0.2Â10 6 p.f.u. ml À1 and 3.5±0.1Â10 6 p.f.u. ml À1 , respectively (P=0.4393). This result confirmed that immunization with the influenza vaccine did not confer any protection against the RG1 recombinant virus. Of note, the HA sequences of viruses recovered from the lung homogenates on day 4 p.c. were found to be identical to the sequences of the inoculated viruses for each group of mice.
Characterizing single and combined HA mutants by HAI and MN tests suggests residues E158 and R159 as major determinants for antigenic alteration in A(H1N1)pdm09 virus.
To further refine the impact of specific HA mutations on antigenicity, various combined (RG3 to RG7) and six single (RG8 to RG13) mutants were also rescued as 6 : 2 reassortant viruses and characterized in vitro. In HAI assays, the single RG8 (A198E), RG9 (G143E), RG11 (K166E) and RG12 (T80R) mutants, the double RG6 (G143E/A198E) mutant and the penta-mutant RG2 did not show any change in HAI titres compared to the WT. However, the hexa-mutant RG1, the various combined mutants RG3 (T80R/G143E/G158E/K166E/A198E), RG4 (T80R/G143E/ G158E/A198E), RG5 (G143E/G158E/A198E) and RG7 (G158E/N159D), and the single mutants RG10 (G158E) and RG13 (N159D) demonstrated significant (!four-fold or 2-log 2 ) lower HAI titres than the WT virus when using A/California/07/09 ferret antiserum ( Table 1 ). The fold differences for the latter mutants ranged from 16-to 256-fold (4 log 2 to 8 log 2 ), with the greatest difference observed for the RG1 virus. As expected, no HAI titres were observed for any of the tested viruses when using the naive ferret antiserum (HAI titres 10) (data not shown). These HA mutant viruses were also tested by MN assay ( Table 1 ). The following HA mutants had significantly (!fourfold) reduced MN titres compared to the WT: RG1, RG3, RG4, RG5, RG7, RG10, RG12 and RG13. As expected, none of the viruses was neutralized by the naive ferret antiserum (MN titres 20) (data not shown). Although HAI and MN titres did not match perfectly, there was a good correlation between the two assays, except for mutant RG12 (T80R), which was as reactive as the WT by HAI, but yielded lower titres in the MN assay.
DISCUSSION
The identification and characterization of HA mutations with the potential to cause a viral drift among currently circulating influenza viruses is of great public health importance, as it may impact on the effectiveness of the influenza vaccine, the major means for the control of influenza epidemics. The absence of a significant drift in A (H1N1) during the 2009-2016 period and the emergence of a major A(H3N2) drift in the 2014-2015 season further legitimate predictive studies to detect HA variants. Different approaches have been used in order to assess HA substitutions that could mediate such antigenic drifts [13] [14] [15] [16] . Among these, the identification of escape mutants with a panel of monoclonal antibodies (MAbs) seems to be the most reliable approach, since it relies on biological and immunological realities rather than hypothetical or random mutations, which may lead to irrelevant substitutions or defective viruses [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . A previous antigenic study on A (H1N1)pdm09 identified the Sa antigenic site as an immunodominant site eliciting a neutralizing MAb [22] . During our previous study, which led to the identification of escape mutations within the H1 antigenic sites, three out of six mutations were located within the Sa antigenic site, which also denotes its immunodominance [10] . Furthermore, the reactivity observed with most ferret polyclonal antisera against A(H1N1)pdm09 is also directed towards residues within the Sa antigenic site [23, 24] .
Our experiments showed that the two HA mutants (RG1 and RG2) that originated from our virus escape studies were successfully rescued. HAI and MN results using 6 : 2 WT, RG1 and RG2 reassortant viruses reiterate the strategic importance and reliability of the antigenic sites (Ca1, Ca2, Cb, Sa and Sb) initially reported by Caton et al. [25] . Regarding the RG2 mutations (located outside the antigenic sites), we cannot totally exclude the possibility that some of them may cause antigenic alterations by themselves (which was not tested in our study), but this seems unlikely. According to the observations made on the A(H3N2) drifts that followed the Hong Kong pandemic of 1968, at least four aa substitutions within two or three antigenic sites are necessary to result in a !fourfold (2-log 2 ) difference in HAI titres against homologous sera [26] . Our RG1 virus had six mutations within three antigenic sites (Cb, Ca2 and Sa), which matched such a drift definition; however, this was not the case for the RG2 virus with five mutations, all located outside antigenic sites. Furthermore, at least for the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, our work shows that single mutations within the Sa site may result in a significant drift.
In immunization experiments using the trivalent 2015-16 vaccine containing the A/California/07/2009 (H1N1) component, the vaccine was shown to confer a protective effect against challenge with the WT virus, but no protection was observed against the RG1 variant. This observation further confirms the relevance of these mutations in causing a vaccine drift. Studies on drift mutations in A(H3N2) viruses led to the concept that specific aa changes could be determinant for the loss of reactivity with the homologous serum. In fact, seven drift-prone aa residues that are located in antigenic sites A (145) and B (155, 156, 158, 159, 185 and 193) have been identified as causing all of the A(H3N2) drifts that occurred after the 1968 Hong Kong pandemic [26] . Our in vitro experiments identified that some of the same residues (158 and 159) near the RBS are also the major determinant of antigenic drifts in the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. Both of these positions are located in the Sa antigenic site that also contains mutation K166E, which only altered antigenicity by MN. Interestingly, a K166Q mutation has previously been found to cause antigenic alteration using preexposed human sera [27] Our results converge with those from Koel et al., whose findings identified the Sa antigenic site as harbouring potential drift mutations in A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses [9] . Other studies using clinical samples [28, 29] identified substitutions G158K and N159K as minor populations through deep-sequencing methodologies in vaccinated patients from Wisconsin (USA) and substitutions G158E and N159K in patients from Southeast Asia. In addition, another animal investigation involving serial A(H1N1)pdm09 virus passages in ferrets that were sub-optimally immunized identified N159K as a potential drift substitution [30] . Interestingly, our results not only consolidate other investigators' findings on potential drifts of A(H1N1)pdm09, but also add new information about the escape mutations we reported previously [10] .
The strength of the present study consists of the in vivo protection studies of immunologically relevant escape mutations. Moreover, our in vitro characterization of several reassortants, i.e. RG1 to RG13, allowed us to pinpoint drift mutations in the Sa antigenic site, with the predominant effect of two mutations that are adjacent to the RBS: G158E and N159D. Our study used a reverse-genetic approach that offers the possibility of analysing the impact of selected changes without other potential interfering mutations or the presence of viral quasi-species [19] . On the other hand, this study also has some limitations regarding the potential implications of our results in clinic. Indeed, we did not consider the effect of pre-existing immunity, especially against pre-pandemic seasonal A(H1N1) virus. In that matter, Koel et al. showed that many of the substitutions within the Sa site that were not reactive with the ferret A(H1N1)pdm09 antiserum were more reactive using sera from individuals pre-exposed to previous seasonal A(H1N1) viruses, providing a possible explanation for the lack of drifted pandemic viruses in humans until now [9] . Interestingly, a comparison of seasonal and pandemic Sa antigenic sites showed that only five out of 13 aa (38 %) are identical with the conserved residues at position 158 but not at position 159 [10] . Although HA and NA are the major surface antigenic glycoproteins involved in vaccine protection, we cannot completely rule out that some serological differences could be explained by the backbone constituted of viral proteins originating from A/PR/8/34.
In conclusion, we showed that mutations in the Sa antigenic site of A(H1N1)pdm09, such as G158E and N159D, are associated with a significant drift in vitro that correlates with a lack of protection conferred by the current A(H1N1) vaccine component (A/California/07/09) in mice. Close monitoring for the emergence of these mutations in clinic is essential for timely replacement of the influenza vaccine strain.
METHODS

Rescue of reassortant viruses
All of the reassortant viruses in the present study are novel and were rescued specifically for this work. A 12-plasmid reverse-genetics system, which includes the pLLB plasmids containing HA and NA genes from influenza A/Quebec/ 144147/09 (an A/California/07/09-like A(H1N1)pdm09 strain) (GenBank accession numbers FN434458 and FN434459, respectively), the pHH21 transcription plasmids containing the six internal (PB2, PB1, PA, NP, M and NS) segments from A/PR/8/34 (H1N1) strain as well as the polymerase and nucleoprotein expression plasmids (pCAGGS-PA, -PB1, -PB2, -NP), was used for the rescue of 6 : 2 reassortant viruses. Single and combined mutations (Table 1) were introduced into the A(H1N1)pdm09 pLLB-HA plasmid using appropriate primers and the QuikChange site-directed mutagenesis kit (Stratagene). The resulting HA-plasmids were then sequenced to ensure the absence of undesired mutations. The HA mutant viruses were generated by co-transfecting 293 T cells with the set of 12 plasmids as previously described [11] . Viruses recovered in supernatants of transfected cells were passaged twice in Madin-Darby canine kidney cells overexpressing a2-6 sialic acid receptors (ST6-Gal-I MDCK) prior to testing [31] . The rescued viruses were titrated by standard plaque assays and their HA genes were sequenced to confirm the correct genotypes.
Viral replication in vitro
The replicative capacities of the 6 : 2 reassortant viruses were evaluated by infecting ST6GalI-MDCK cells at an MOI of 0.0001 plaque-forming unit (p.f.u.)/cell. Supernatants were collected at 24, 48 and 96 h post-inoculation (p.i.) and titrated by plaque assays using ST6GalI-MDCK cells.
Analysis of receptor-binding specificity using HA and HA-elution assays Serial twofold dilutions of viruses were prepared in 50 µl of PBS in U-bottomed 96-well plates to which 50 µl of 1 % suspension of RBCs (from guinea pigs, turkeys and chickens) expressing different types of receptors was added (Table S1 ). Plates were incubated at 4
C for 1 h and HA titres were determined. For HA-elution assays, eight HA units of viruses were mixed with selected RBCs and the plates were incubated at 4 C for 1 h to allow agglutination to occur. The plates were then incubated at 37 C to allow virus elution. Elution was followed by the appearance of pelleted erythrocytes. The plates were monitored at the indicated times to determine the rate at which elution occurred (Table S1 ).
Immunoenzymatic assay (ELISA)
In order to confirm the immunization of mice to be challenged with reassortant viruses, we tested animal sera by ELISA. Briefly, 50 ng of trivalent influenza vaccine (Fluviral 2015-16, GSK) in 50 µl of carbonate buffer (pH 9.6) was adsorbed overnight at 4 C into 96-well plates. After three washes with PBS/Tween 0.05 % (PBS-T) and blocking with 3 % BSA for 3 h at room temperature, plates were washed seven times with PBS-T. Then 50 µl of mouse sera (diluted 1/1000 in PBS) was added to each well and incubated for 1 h at room temperature. After another seven PBS-T washes, 50 µl of anti-mouse IgG (Promega), diluted 1/2500 in PBS was added to each well and incubated for 1 h before being washed seven times with PBS-T. The TMB (3,3,5,5-tetramethylbenzidine) substrate (Fitzgerald Laboratories) was added for 10 min and the reaction was stopped by adding 50 µl of 2 M H 2 SO 4 solution. Absorbance was measured at 450 nm and wells with an optical density (A 450 ) >three times that of the naive serum were considered positive [10] .
Haemagglutination inhibition assay (HAI)
In vitro characterization of reassortant mutants was performed by HAI according to standard protocols [32] . Hyper-immune ferret antiserum raised against A/California/07/09 (H1N1) virus and naive ferret antiserum were used in the assay. Non-specific inhibitors were removed by overnight treatment with receptor-destroying enzyme (Denka Seiken) at 37 C followed by 30 min of complement inactivation at 56 C. Both of these antisera were tested against all viruses generated in the study using a 0.5 % solution of turkey red blood cells (Lampire Biologicals). Serum titres were considered to be significantly different from the control if they differed by !fourfold (2-log 2 ).
Microneutralization (MN) assays
In vitro characterization of reassortant mutants was also performed by using MN [33] . Briefly, serial twofold dilutions of heat-inactivated hyper-immune and naive ferret antisera were prepared, starting from a 1 : 20 dilution. Equal volumes of serum and virus were mixed and incubated for 60 min at room temperature. The residual infectivity of the virus-serum mixture was determined in MDCK cells using four wells for each dilution of serum. The neutralizing serum titre was defined as the reciprocal of the serum dilution that completely neutralized the infectivity of 100 TCID 50 of the virus, as determined by the absence of cytopathic effect on the MDCK cells at day 4 p.i.
Animal studies
Groups of twelve 6-week-old female C57BL/6 mice were purchased from Charles River. Animals were randomized based on their body weight and housed four or five per cage in a BSL-2 environment that prevented cage-to-cage transmission. On day 0, two groups of 12 mice received 50 µl of saline (mock-immunized group) on each thigh, whereas another two groups of 12 mice were immunized intramuscularly with 1.5 µg in 50 µl saline for each thigh of the 2015-2016 trivalent Fluviral vaccine (GSK) composed of 15 µg HA/500 µl of the following strains: A/California/7/2009 (H1N1), A/Switzerland/9715293/2013 (H3N2) and B/Phuket/3073/2013. A boost immunization was repeated two weeks later. Mice were bled on days 0, 14 and 28, and sera were tested by ELISA assay as described above. On day 29 (day 0 of challenge), the four experimental groups of mice were inoculated intranasally, under isoflurane anaesthesia, with 2Â10 4 p.f.u. (about 1-4 LD 50 ) of either the hexamutant RG1 or WT 6 : 2 reassortant viruses. A group of five non-infected mice served as a naive control group. Mice (n=8) were monitored twice daily for body weight loss and mortality over a period of 14 days. When their body weight loss reached 25 %, mice were humanely euthanized by cervical dislocation under isoflurane anaesthesia. There was no unexpected mortality. Subgroups of four mice from each experimental group were sacrificed at day 4 p.i. for determination of LVTs. The lungs were sampled aseptically and homogenized in 1 ml sterile PBS. The homogenates were centrifuged at 1455 g for 10 min and supernatants were titrated by plaque assays. This study was carried out with the approval of the institutional animal care committee of the Centre Hospitalier Universitaire de Qu ebec in accordance with the national guidelines for the use of animals in laboratory experiments (CCAC-Canadian Council of Animal Care) [34] .
Statistics and software Survival rates were assessed with Kaplan-Meier survival analysis. All P values were obtained using the Student comparison t-test. GraphPad Prism version 5.04 software was used for all statistical analyses. 
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